"Find us a time" is three jobs: checking free slots, holding your own time, and inviting others. Only the last affects anyone, so AI should stop at proposing slots until a person confirms a full preview.
When AI cleans a shared drive, delete can mean trash or permanent removal. Judge it by recovery: AI lists candidates, a person approves a quarantine, a sample restore proves it, and deletion is decided later.
When an AI agent calls several systems for a user, the usual shortcuts are a shared account or passing one credential down the chain. Both hide who authorized what; a new, narrow credential per stop keeps that trail.
An AI agent on an employee's ERP account leaves only that name in the logs, so no one can tell who changed what or stop just the AI. Give it its own identity, deny by default, and escalate above set amounts.
Model prices keep falling, yet long AI tasks still bring surprise bills. The money goes to resending context and rerunning failures, so the limit belongs in code outside the model, as one budget per task.
When an AI workflow tool is exposed, the danger is the credentials stored in each flow. Close entry points, preserve logs, rotate by which flow held which key, and reissue with less access.
Malicious AI agent extensions can hide harmful parts until runtime and slip past over 90% of install-time scans. Before installing, run one with no real data, network, or write access, and see what it touches.